Confusion in the Field of Divorce Law by Grant, Robert A.
Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 5 | Issue 4 Article 7
1-1-1930
Confusion in the Field of Divorce Law
Robert A. Grant
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Commentary is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an
authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
Robert A. Grant, Confusion in the Field of Divorce Law, 5 Notre Dame L. Rev. 218 (1930).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol5/iss4/7
EDITORIAL COMMENT
CONFUSION IN THE FIELD OF DIVORCE
LAW
The power to grant a divorce is a statutory and not a
common law power. At one time granted by the legislatures in
the several states, it is now grantedby the sentence of a court
of justice pursuant to general law.
Each state jealously guards its own right to determine
the status of its people, and the reluctance of the states to sur-
render any of this power, together with the consequent multi-
tude of various state laws has made the law concerning many
subjects, and particularly that pertaining to divorce, in apparent
hopeless conflict. It is in this field of the law, if at all anywhere,
that uniformity is to be desired.
It is fairly well settled that a decree of divorce rendered
in a jurisdiction where neither party is domiciled is not entitled
to recognition in another state under the full faith and credit
clause of the Constitution, for the record may be contradicted as
to the facts necessary to give the court jurisdiction. The fact
that both plaintiff and defendant have appeared personally in
the divorce suit will ndt supply the lack of jurisdiction.
(Andrews v. Andrews. 188 U. S. 14.) The difficulty arises where
husband and wife have separate domiciles, and this has been
aggravated by the fact that some American courts have gone
far in recognizing the power of the wife to establish her own
separate domicile. Even in jurisdictions where the wife cannot
ordinarily establish a separate domicile it is well settled that, for
the purpose of divorce, an injured and innocent wife may ac-
quire a domicile separate from that of the husband. (Atherton
v. Atherton. 181 U. S. 155.) So, too, if the husband, for the
purpose of obtaining a divorce, removes and acquires a domicile
in another state, the domicile of the innocent wife will not neces-
sarily follow his but will remain in the state where she actually
resides. (Perkins v. Perkins. 225 Mass. 82.) When the parties
are so separated a divorce may generally be secured at the domi-
cile of either. What is to be the effect of such a decree in another
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state, on general principles of Conflict of Laws or under the
full faith and credit clause of the Constitution? Will it bind the
absent defendant? Will it make any difference if the defendant
has been personally served with process in the state where the
decree was rendered, or was merely given actual or constructive
notice by publication in accordance with the law of the state?
It is here that the laws of the many states are widely divergent.
Some hold that a decree rendered at the domicile of one of
the parties should be entitled to -recognition elsewhere even
though the other party was not before the court rendering the
decree. This view seems to be the weight of authority. The
minority holding is to the effect that recognition of such a de-
cree will not be compelled under the full faith and credit clause
of the Constitution, unless the defendant was personally s.ub-
jected to the jurisdiction of the court rendering the decree.
As to the question of the recognition which the Constitution
demands, where the decree is rendered at the domicile of one
party only, there are two leading cases. The one is Atherton
v. Atherton, 181 U. S. 155, decided in 1901. In this case the hus-
band was suing for divorce in Kentucky. There was no personal
service on the wife, a non-resident, nor had she appeared in the
action, but notice of the proceedings had been sent to her in
accordance with the Kentucky statute. The New York court
held that the 'Kentucky decree was inoperative against the wife
and granted a divorce in her favor. This was reversed by the
United States Supreme Court on the ground that full faith and
credit had been denied the Kentucky decree. The other case is
Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562, decided in 1906. In this
case the parties were married and lived in New York. The
husband removed to Connecticut where he was granted a divorce,
with service by publication on the wife. Later the wife brought a
suit for separation in New York. The husband set up as a de-
fense the decree obtained in Connecticut. The defense was re-
jected by the New York court. The United States Supreme
Court held that this was no violation of the full faith and credit
clause of the Constitution. The difference between the cases is
that in the Atherton case the decree was rendered against a
nonresident defendant at the matrimonial domicile of the hus-
band and wife, and in the Haddock case it was not. Then the
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question presents itself: why distinguish between the extent of
the jurisdiction in the matrimonial domicile and that admitted
to exist to some extent in a domicile later acquired?
Some states have held that their courts will not take juris-
diction if the offense does not constitute a ground for divorce in
the state where the act was committed, although it is a ground
for divorce in the state where the action was brought. (Perzel
v. Perzel. 91 Ky. 634.) Many states hold just the contrary, that
is, they will grant a divorce to anyone who establishes a domi-
cile there for any cause recognized as a ground in the jurisdiction
where the divorce is sought. (Gregory v. Gregory. 78 Me. 187.)
(Wilcox v. Wilcox. 10 Ind. 436.)
It is regretted that such a condition exists and some form
of uniform legislation on the matter should be sought for and
is sincerely desired. Uniform marriage and divorce legislation
is the only means that take the laws regulating the status of
married and divorced persons out of its present chaotic condition.
The desired uniform legislation would remove one cause of the
present tangleby making grounds for divorce the same in each
state, thus removing the inducement to migration for divorce
purposes. Full faith and credit would be given to all decrees
of other states where rendered in substatial conformity with the
jurisdictional requirements of the uniform statute. The problem
might also be solved by Constitutional amendment followed
by Congressional legislation, but it seems to the writer that a
uniform divorce act, when properly drawn, and given proper
support by the states, would prove to be the desirable solution.
-R. A. G.
